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CITY OF SAN DIEGO V. SUPERIOR OOURT
r36 C.2d 483: 124 P.2d 6851

[L. A. No. 21653.

In Bank.

4~3

Dec. 15, 1950. J

TilE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, v THE SUPERIOR
COlTRT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY f't al.. Respondents.

)

(1) Prohibition-Adequacy of Other Remedies-When Appeal Inadequate.-A remedy by appeal froU! the judgment at the end
of II trial is not such a plain, speedy and ad(>quate rellledy in
th(> ordinary course of law as will preclude issuance of a writ
of prohibition, where the court hae. no jurisdictiou to proceed
with the action. and no appeal IF available before final judgment.
(2] Appeal-Orders Appealable-Special Orders After Final Judgment.-An order amending an ordel vacating a default judg.
ment by striking a provision in the vacating order for determining the valut' of condt'mnea property is not appealablt' as
a special Older after final judgment, since there is no longer
8ny such jUdgment in the action, and the amendin~ order does
not affect the default judgment .but mert'ly recognizes its
"lIc8tion.
lS) Eminent Domain-Judgment and Oraer-Modi1ication.-lD a
cClndemulltion proceeding, BD order fixing a date for the determination of the property's value is Dot merely a procf'durnl
order made during th(> course of the proceeding such til> the
court may modify at any time before judgment, wher(> it 101
an int~gral part of an order vacating a default judgment under
Code Civ. Proc., § 473, specifying thE' terms on which such
relief is granted.
(4] Id.-Judgment and Order-Modification.-In a cond(>mnation
proceeding in which a default judgment has been l'nterl'd,
the court exercises its judicial diserE'tion, after a full henrin)!,
in including in an order vacating such judl!ment a provi!'<ion
that the damages be determined as of thE' date summons was
issued, and any error occurring in thl' exercise of such discretion may not be corrected except by appeal.
[5] Prohibition-Grounds for Relief-Want of Jurisdiction.-A!lsuming that prohibition will not lie to revie," a eompJ(>tI'd
judicial BCt, if it comprises a void ord(>r, the writ will issue
to restrain further judicial action based on !'lllch Clrd(>r.
[1] See 21 Cal.Jur. 588; 42 Am.Jur. 144.
[2] See 2 Cal.Jur. 150. 2 Am.JUl. 90il.
Mr.K. Dig. References: [1] Prohihition, ~ 14(2}. f21 ApPl'Blllnd
f:rror, §51.lj [3,4] Eminent Demain, ';173; (5] Prohibition,
§ 16(1).
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the
. Court of San Diego County and Robert B. Burch, 88
thereof, from proceeding with a trial in a certain
Writ granted.
J. F. DuPaul, City Attorney, Douglas D.
Thomas J. Fanning, Deputy City Attorneys, for
Warren E. Libby and Harry A. Chamberlin for
ents and Real Parties in Interest.
TRA YNOR, J .-The city of San Diego seeks a
prohibition to restrain the superior court from
with the trial of a condemnation action pursuant to an
vacating part of an earlier order. The case is presented .
demurrer by two of the defendants in the condemnation
as real parties in interest, who are hereinafter referred
respondents.
On Decembl'r 14, 1945. the city brought an action to
demn cprtain land needed in the development of
Bay Park in the Mission Bay area of the city.
oWDpd realty included among the large number
,involved. Summons on the complaint was issued on J.I~'CCj:UU1
. 14. 1945. and served on respondents on July 31, 1946.
was entered against them on December 12. 1946. and
judgment was entered on December 13, 1946. It was
that the value of the property was $18.000 on December
1945. and petitioner deposited this amount in court.
.
On May 9. 1947. respondents filed notice of a motion to
aside the default and judgment on the grounds that
were entered "prematurely and without authority of
and "through the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and
cusabJe neglect of defendants." Before and during the '-_ .. M'·....
ing on the motion to vacate the ;judgment, the city
to stipulate that the judgment be vacated and reElpond~en~tB
allowed a trial on the issue of necessity. if the order
contained a provision that the damages be determined _
December 14. 1945. the date the summons was issued.
OffPT was basen on sections 473 and 1249 of the Code of
Procedure. Under spction 473. "The court may, "pon
terms as may be .iust. relieve a party or his legal 1'PTIl"PJQPntlltive
from 8 judgment, order. or other proceeding taken agI!iUlR":~
him through his mistake, inadvertence. surprise or excusabl~
neglect." (Italics added.) Section 1249 provides: "For the
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pllrJlollt' of assessing compensation and damages the right
t1l1'rl'of shall be deemed t.o have accrued at the date of the
1111'1111111'" of summons and its actual value at that date shall
hi. thl' measure of compensation for all property to be taken,
, , provided, that in any case in which the issue is not tried
within olle year after the date of the commencement of the
.1" iOIl, unlrss the delay is caused by the defendant, the comJI"lIsRtion and damages shall be deemed to have accrued at
Ih.· dllt!' of the trial. .. ," By the offer to stipulate the
rity ~()lIght to preserve its right to have the damages assessed
a... of tht' datr of the issuance of summons. Respondents apflllrl'ntly rrfnsed so to stipulate, since there was a full hearing
1111.' argument on the motion to vacate. On May 26, 1947.
aft.·r that hearing, an order vacating the default and judgment
was I'nterrd. The order also provided: "It is further ordered
thllt th!' market value and damages [of this land], upon the
trilll of said action. shall be determined and fixed as of Del't'lIlber 14, 1945."
Nl'arly three years later, on March 6, 1950, respondents
fllt'd notice of a motion to amend the order vacating the judgnwnt by striking the part settling the date at which the
prQprrty was to be valued, on the ground that this part of
tlu:,'ordpr "was and is erroneou~, contrary to law, .and.beyl;t@_ _
thl' power of the conrt. ,. The motion was denied by the
jlldg~ who made the original order without prejudice to its
rrlwwal at the time of trial. The motion was renewed'at
that time before another judge who, after a hearing, granted
it on March 28, 1950. Petitioner now seeks a writ of prohibition to preveilt the trial court from proceeding to try
th .. action on a theory of damages other than that established
by the original order relieving respondents from default.
[1] The writ of prohibition will not issue when there is
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1103.) It is settled, however,
that the remedy in the ordinary course of law by an appeal
from the judgment at the end of the trial is not aliequate
When the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the aetlOn
and no appeal is available before final judgment. (Tomales
Bf1l1 etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d 389, 392 [217
P.2d 9681.) It is necessary to determine therefore whether
the city could have appealed from the order modifying the
ordrr vaE'l1ting the default judgment. and if not. whether the
Court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the
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action on a theory of damages other than that spe:cltied;
the first order.
[2] The default judgment was vacated by the
May 26, 1947. and accordingly, since there was no
any final judgment in the action the order of March 28. 1
was not appealablp as a spt'cial order after final
(Sharp v. Miller, 66 Cal. 98 [4 P. 10651; ct. Schubert v.
30 CaJ.2d 785. 788-789 [185 P.2d 793].) It could be l"Pv;ipWfI
by appeal only on an appeal from the subsequent
judgment. Moreover. to be appealable as a special
made after final judgment within the meaning of section
of the Code of Civil Procedure. an order must affect
judgment in some way. (Williams v. Superior COttrt. l4
2d 656. 666 [96 P .2d 3341.) The order of March 28.
did not affect the default judgment but accepted its Vii\::iiU.~AI;:i"
three years earlier.
[3] Respondents contend that the order fixing the
8S of which damages should be measured was merely 8
cedural ruling made during the course of the action
that therefore the court had jurisdiction to modify it at
time before final judgment. (See, City of Los A ngelea .
Oliver, 102 Cal.App. 299, 325-326 [283 P. 298] ; De la Hef,:.It.:.WUll ....
v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 496, 499 [80 P. 717]; Barth
Ten Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829. 833 {l08 P.2d 675).) In the nrellen'
case, however, the order fixing the date as of which
would be assessed was not merely a procedural order
during the course of the trial: it was an integral part of
order vacating a judgment under section 473 of the
of Civil Procedure specifying the terms upon which
relief would be granted.
[4] The order settled a major issue between the
namely, the basis on which the valup of the n?(\npl'TV
be determined. Respondents had moved to vacate the
judgment, and the trial court. in an exercise of its dislcre1t10Jl
relieved respondents of default as to the issue of the n1'(\npjpt111ta
of the taking, but in effect held that because of the
caused by respondents the city was entitled, under
1249 of the Code of Civil Procedure to obtain the land at
value at the date of the issuance of summons. The
decision was arrived at after considering the conflicting "."'·~,l,JlI
in the affidavits and counteraffidavits of the parties, its
to limit the issues of a trial granted under section 4
the provisions of section 1249 as to the date of
The part of the order limiting the issues of the trial was
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fx('rcise of judicial discretion and was not entered by lDad\'ertence or clerical error. U respondents w~re dissatisfipd
with the refusal of the court unconditioually to vacate the
dl·fllult judgment. their remedy was by appeal from that
(ml!'r (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 938. 963; Cuan v. S11perlOr Cour'.
]4 ('nl.2d 591 [95 P.2d 931) ; see, AJa:rwll llordware Co v.
Fo.,ttr. 207 Cal. 167, 170 [277 P. 3271) but they did not
8\'oil themselves of it. [n fact they raisf'd no obje('tion for
nl'arly three years. and then attack('d only a part of tbe
order solely on the ground that it was legall~' erroneous.
This was an attempt to correct a claimed judicial error The
ft'('ord is clear that the city did oot COOSf'nt to tbe modifit'ation (Cf., Phelan v Superwr Oourt. 35 Cal.2d 363. 373
1217 P.2d 951).)
"I J 1udicial error which occurs in the rendition of orders
or judgment!' which are tht' fault of an exercise of judicial
(lis('retion may not be corr('('ted px('ep1 by statutory pro(,I'dnre." as foT' pxamplt'. nnder seetlOns 473 and 663 of the
Codp of Civil Procedurp (Phill,ps v. Tr1Mhetm, 25 Cal.2d 913.
!116 f156 P.2d 251 . Barlou' v. Oity Council of Inglewood, 32
Cal.2d 688 [197 P .2d 7211; Bastaj1an v. Brown. 19 Ca1.2d
20!l1120 P.2d 9) ; Mo.~t Worshtpful Lodge v.Sons etc. Lodge,
91 Cal.App.2d 582 (2b5 P.2d 722].) "The decisions of this
{'ourt are numerous and uniform to the effect that a judgment
or order OOCf' regularly ~ntered can be reviewed and set aside
only in the modes prescribed byt;tatute.
[S Jubject to
th('se exceptions (inadvertence and clerical error I the order
is reviewable only on appeal. and the decision of the trial
court having been once made after regular submission of the
motion its power is exhausted-it is funct1l., officio. rCitations.]" (Holtum 'V. Grief. '.44 Cal. 521, 524-525 (78 P. 11J;
Bowman v. Bowman. 29 Ca1.2d 808, 813-814 \178 P.2d 751.
170 A.L.R. 2461.)
{5] Respondents contend. however, that even if the order
of 1950 is void. it is a completed judicial a('t and therefore
prohibition will not lie to review its validity. (See, Big bm
Jlines v. Superior Oourt. 9 Ca1.2d 503. 504 [71 P.2d 67);
State Bd. of Equaltzation 'V. Superior Oourt. 9 Cal.2d 252, 254
f70 P.2d 482].) '1;'he writ is not sought. however. to review
th~t order but to prevent the trial court from proceeding to
trial Upon all issues despite the express limitation in the original order that one of the main isslles was settled and was not to
be further litigated. Since it is further judicial action based
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upon a void order that petitioner seeks to restrain, nrc)hililli
is a proper remedy. (Hunter v. Superior Court, 36 "' .......... ,...
100, 110 [97 P.2d 492] ; Stevens v. Superior Court, 7,
110 [59 P.2d 988].)
Let the peremptory writ issuE' aR prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., ilud Spence, J.,
currt'd.
CAH1'EH, J.-I dissent.
The majority opmion is based on thE' following
The order vacating the judgment. entered pursuant
motion made under section 473 of the Code of Civil J.>..,n..~A.
which contained a provision fixing the time for iI"'~"'P1mi"
the value of the property, could not be vacated or
-that is, the court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Th"...."""
the order striking out such provision was void. Being
the trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the
of the' case in reliance upon saio void order. Hence PJ"II}DIUJ'lI1III
tion.-a jurisdictional writ. was proper; that the court
no jurisdiction other than to follow the provision fixing
for determining value in the vacatinl! order. That l'P.RrJlnllm
is squarely contrary to Phelan v. 81lperior Court, 35
363 [217 P.2d 951], where the trial ('ourtin its order
Ii motion for a new trial ordered the judgment reduced·
amount. This is similar to the provision fixing time
dett'rminiug value in the vacating' order in the instant
This court after stating in the Phplan ease that WflWU.1UU
is not available until 8 request is made to the trial court
correet its error, said ~ ''In the preRent case petitioner
have made a motion under FIe-dian 473 of the Code of
Procedure to vacate the- portion of th.e order claimed
invalid. Instead of making such motion petitioner ....AUf!(U
until after the time for appeal had passed and then
. this application fOT writ of mandate. without ever L __'-:_'0.":;
presented the matteT to the trial court. There is no ShOWmg.,il
that the question was raised in any manner before the trial.,
court or that it would have been futile to do so. ,. (Emphasis.!
added.) (Phelan v. Superior Oourt. 35 Cal.2d 363. 372 f211j
P.2d 951J.) If the claimed invalid part of the orde-r could,[
there be eliminated by the trial conrt. it had jurisdiction tol
do so. There. as here. the trial court had .iurisdiction under:
section 473 to consider the que!;;tion of whether the provisioDj
fixing the time for determining value-the claimed invalidJ
,"j
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wrtion of the vacating order, should be eliminated. Having
jurisdiction, its order striking out such invalid provision was
not void, and constituted nothing more than error made in
thl' exercise of its jurisdiction.
'It bas been repeatedly held that a trial court bas jurisdiction
to vacat.e or modify a previous order made by it, even though
thr prior order is fina1 and appea1able. (Harth v. Ten Eyck,
]6 Ca1.2d 829 [l08 P.2d 675); De 1.0 Beckwith v. 8uperior
Court, 146 Cal. 496 [80 P. 717]; Imperial Beverage Co. v.
Superior Coort, 24 Cal.2d 627 [150 P.2d 881] ; Key 8ystem
Trann' Unes v. 8uperior Court. ante, p. 184 [222 P.2d
8671; People v. Eggers, SO Cal.2d 676 (185 P.2d 1].) For
illustration it is said in the Imperia) Beverage Co. ease (p.
634): "It is fUrther contended that the order denying the
flrst motion for a stay is res judicata as to the subsequent
motion. While the plea of res judicata may be a good defense
to an action in which it is interposed, it does not deprive the
court· of jurisdiction over the action nor does it deprive the t
court of jurisdiction to pass upon and decide a motion after
it has previously dpcided a like motion. Its action upon the
5('cond motion may be erroneous, but it is not in excess of
JurisdIction. (Harth v. Ten Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829, 882 UOS
'·.2d 6751.)" If a court can hear and determine a motion
. where the identicaJ motion 'was previously made and deni.,(t
by a finaJ order. it certainly bas jurisdiC'tion to bear and
determine a motion to modify the first order. In the Key
Systt'm case, supra. 8 motion to dismiss an action for failure
to prosecute was granted. Thereafter. onplaiutift"s motion,
an order was made vacating the order of dismissal. The
Rame grounds existed in each ease before the first motion.
In denying prohibition, which was sought to prevent the court
rrom proceeding with the trial, because the court lacked jurisdiction to makt' the second order, two members of this court
Raid(p. 186): "The arguments of the petitioner invoke
applieation 'of the policy requiring finality of judgments and
orders. That policy generally controls where a judgment or
order is entered after a trial on the merits of the litigatIon.
. But the policy has not been deemed controlling wht're
the judgment or order set aside was in the exercise of a discretionary power not based on the merits of the &etlon. . . •
In giving effect to that policy appellate courts have generally
refrained from int~rferinf! on jurilld;rfinnnl 21"ol1D1iR with thf>
trial courl', reconst.deratwn 01 a discret&01llJrll order nut blUed
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on tIle filer-ii:; of 'ht IIIlgfltwn. (Sc(', Kenney v. Kelleher,
Cal. 442; 0(, 10 Bt'cku"'" Y. Superlor Coltrt, 146 Cat 496
~I/IJ"r/(Jr Court,169 Cal. 675 [147 P.
Barth. v Tetl Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829 [108 P.2d 675]; MCllI,na.lIIl1
v Silvery, 6 Cal.2d 629, 631 l59 P.2d 98j: Wathns v.
Cartney, 70 Cal.App. 137 1232 P. 982].)" (EmphasIs .....'."....'1511
The eourt said in Pt'ople v. Eggers, wpra, 692: "8cc~tioi1i',l
1026 of the Penal Code authorizes a separate trial upon
is!luE' of insanity and specifically authorizes the court, in
cllscrE'tion, to retalD or dismiss the jury which tried the
al'lion The directIOn to retain the first Jury is deDomi
all order (Code Civ. Proc.. § tOoa \ and every court has o'n.........
ttl amend and control its orders so as to make them eOllltfllrmlAbl1l!
til law and justIce. \ Code eiv Proe .. § 128. subd 8.)
qll~stionably. the trial court was lDvest('d with j
to make an order retaining the jury, and it must be COlIt!PI1ed
that it has iun~dlrt'u11 to modify, revoke, or set its ,..,I....j'~
u..~lde. (lmpenal Betteroge Co. v. Superior Court, 24
627 (150 P.2d 881 J ; Harth v. 7'en Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829
P.2d 675]; De la Beckwith v. Supertor Court, 146 Cal.
180 P. 717] ; BUf'bank v. Oontinental Life Ins. 00.,2 "'..""""It'I'......
2d 664 [38 P.2d 451J; Struck v. Superior Court, 138 ~~~~~
·6i2 [32 P.2d 1110] ; City 0/
Angeles' v."Oliver,
App.299 1283 P. 298j.) The rule stated in .De Za Rl!l!kwtfl&"{I
'Y. 8upenor Court, wpra (p. 499), is as follows: ~lt
common occurrence for a trial court to change its
during the progress of a trial. upon questions of law, and
one would contend that it is not within its po\vcr to do
..
or that it should Dot do 80 when satisfied that the forme;ruling was erroneous.''' (Emphasis added.) It is true there.
are some cases to the contrary (see Phillip. v. Trftesheim,
Cal.2d 913 [156 P.2d 25J) but. there are more in accord
the view of the eases cited above.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the motion to
strike the proviSIon fixing time for determining value in
vacating order was based on thp ground that it was erroneOus
and was beyond the power of the court to make. The order
granting the motion mentlons no ground. It must be p~
sumed, th~r~fore, that it was made under sect~on473 o! the)
Code of Clvtl Procedure, on the ground that It was VOid OD'
its race. (See concurring opmion of Gibson. C. J., and:
Schaller, J. in Key SY!ltem TranRit Line. v. 8u.perior CO'IIrl,i
Ill/pm. Phc1anv. S"pprwr Cnurt. Rupra.) fr thp provision:
fUi!ltl time for deterwlIlIHg \'ulue in the vacating order waS

P. 717J; Glullgle v.
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void the result is not different for the eourt had statutory'
jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc., 9 473) to determine whether
it was void.
In reality the provision fixing time for. determining value
ill litl' vacating order was nothing more than 8 procedural
IIlt'l' ill the process of the trial of the eminent domain pro('I.t·dillg. By it the court merely made an order by which
till' law luI' the triaZ was stated. If it bad made a ruling at
tll;' op~lIing of the trial that the value of the property would
ht' d .. termined as of a eertain date, prohibition would not lie
to prt'vcnt the court from proceeding with the trial. If, when
f'viill'nce was offered as to the value of the property at a
part icular time, and objection was made, the ruling on that
ubjt'ction, right or wrong, would not have authorized prohihit inn to prevent the court from proceeding further with the
trilli. It is said in Johnston v. Super~or Court, 4 Cal.App. 90,
... 11:1 187 P. 211]: "The court baving jurisdiction to make the
rulings, the fact that it may have ruled erroneously does not
ou!'!t it of jurisdiction. Such errors can be reviewed at the
Slillle time and in the same manner as ordinary errors in
urdinary cases, and the fact that petitioner ejected to ba!'!e
",h'!l'~bjections. ..oa.ju.risdil!!Jo!l8:1 grounds cannot change the
. wl'lI-settled rule regulating the review-~iid 'correction of errors
of lnw occurring during the course of a trial. The writ of
prohibition will not . be issued' except in case.s of extreme
n('cessity, and it certainly cannot be used for the purpose of
regUlating the issues in a pending cause and confining them
to a particular scope, or to test the correctness of ruling!; on
motions to strike out the whole or any part of a pleading
filed in a cause over which the court has complete and unquestioned jurisdiction. To tolerate such a practice would
be subversive of the purpose of the writ which is to reRtrain
inferior tribunals and bodies from inflicting wrong under tbe
guise of jurisdiction or authority wbich bas no potential existence. It would invite intolerable delay and annoyance in
every case where a jurisdictional question might percbance .
be incidentally involved, and make this prerogative writ the 1
medium through which appellate courts could exercise supervisory control over inferior tribunals acting within the scope
of their legitimate powers."
The Superior Court of San Diego County nnquestionably
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the action here involved. Having such jurisdiction, it bKS
nlll

)
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po~er and authority to proceE.'d and dispose of the cas'e-nea
and determine the issues-even thougb it may do 80
neously. If the holding in the majority opinion is
that the court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the
.of this case because it struck out the provision in the owl..,;.
vacating the judgment tixing the time for determining
value of the propErty. then. if this writ had not been .U~II(Qlij_.
and the case bad proceeded to judgment; the judgmt'nt
be void and subject to collateral attack. There can·
escape from this conclusion, because, if there is any ....Yu....
law in this country, it is, that in order for a court to
a valid judgment, it must have jurisdiction to hear and oeter-_.J,I
mine the cause. (7 Cal.Jur. 594; 8 Oal.Jur. 858; 15
52; 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, §406.) The majority say,
effect, that the court bas no jurisdiction to permit the
to introduce evidence as to the value of the property
time other than the date on wbich summons was
Would the majority have beld tbe same way if the nl'fl,vUrioDC''i
tixing time for determining value had not bet'n atrieklm
ttl' order vacating the judgment, but the trial judge
disregardt'd such provision and allowed evidence of value
..«?tth_e_ dllte,of the trial without so ad.vising counsel
the_ trial' Would tht' majority grant a writ of ___.1.:1..:60"_
and interrupt the trial or hold the judgment void and
to collateral attack if no such writ wer~ sougbt during
trial but certiorari was sought after the time for appeal
expired' If these questions are answered in the
the majority will usher in a new era in the use of prerogative..
writs heretofore unheard of or even imagined, and the arduon.
labors of the Chief Justice in attempting to clarify tbe law
on this subject will be dissipated and come to naught. (~.
Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 868 {217 P.2d 951 .
Robinson v. Superior Court, 35 CaUd 879 {218 P.2d
Tomales 'Bay etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d
[217 P.2d 968].)
I would deny the writ of prohibition sought in this case.

-"'I

/

Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's and Real PaTties' in Interest petition for:' .. '
rehearing was denied January 11, 1951, Carter, J., and·.
Schauer, J" voted for a rehearing•
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